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ABSTRACT~
Factor supply increases (depresses) output for many of the same reasons that the government 
spending multiplier might be less (greater) than one.  Data from three 2008-9 recession episodes –
the labor supply shifts associated with the seasonal cycle, the 2009 federal minimum wage hike, and 
the collapse of residential construction spending – clearly show that markets absorb an increased 
supply of factors of production by increasing output.  The findings contradict the “paradox of toil” 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The Great Recession of 2008-9 has brought forth some intriguing claims about 
public policy and the nature of factor supply.  Using “New Keynesian” models to guide 
the discussion, a number of economists suggest that government purchases might 
stimulate private spending, rather than crowd it out, thereby increasing total spending 
more than dollar-for-dollar (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2009; Eggertsson, 
2009; Woodford, 2010).  At the same time, few have evaluated current macroeconomic 
policies on the basis of the incentives they provide to supply labor and other factors of 
production.  Is it possible that factor supply does not matter during a recession?  Or even 
worse, that our economy suffers from a “paradox of toil:” expansions in factor supply 
actually reduce aggregate output (Eggertsson, 2010a)? 
Economic theory suggests that the government spending multiplier and the 
paradox of toil are related, because both involve the (general equilibrium) relationship 
between factor supply conditions and private sector factor demand.  Models with 
crowding out predict that a reduction in the supply of factors to the private sector – either 
because the government is using some of those factors or because a distortion causes 
some of the supply to be withheld – ultimately reduces private sector output and factor 
usage.  One mechanism achieving this result is that private sector employers pass on their 
factor costs into output prices, which causes their customers to demand less.  In 
“Keynesian” models, this pass through doesn’t happen and perhaps even the high factor 
rental rates feed back to increased demand for private sector goods.   2
One approach to these questions would be to use historical data to measure the 
government spending multiplier (Barro, 1981; Alesina and Ardagna, 2009; Barro and 
Redlick, 2009; Mountford and Uhlig, 2009; Ramey, 2009) or to measure output effects of 
factor supply growth.  But it has been claimed that historical output responses to 
government spending impulses ought to be atypical of those that occur today, because 
today we are in a deep recession, and monetary policy is fundamentally different than it 
was in the past (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2009; Eggertsson, 2009; 
Woodford, 2010).   
Even without the added burden of estimating a separate multiplier for deep 
recessions, clear and significant shifts in government demand that are economically 
similar to the kinds of spending proposed in government “stimulus” laws are difficult to 
find, and thereby difficult to translate into an accurate estimate of the government 
spending multiplier.  The purpose of this paper is to exploit the ready availability of 
obvious factor supply shifts during this recession to test the Keynesian pass-through 
hypothesis that is at the heart of the paradox of toil and government spending multiplier 
results.  The empirical analysis can be interpreted as tests of whether government 
spending stimulates private spending that are admittedly indirect, but not reliant on the 
historical data. 
Sections II and III use a variant of the Sidrauski (1967) and Calvo (1983) models 
to show how the government purchases multiplier is related to the output effect of factor 
supply shifts, and how both of these differ according to whether output prices are 
“sticky” rather than clearing the market.  As in Woodford (2010), for the purposes of 
illustration I focus on a conception of “sticky prices” for which crowding out is exactly 
zero (the government purchases multiplier is exactly one), and contrast it with the 
“flexible price” case in which crowding out is strictly positive.  Section IV explains how 
an economy with sticky output prices may nonetheless occasionally behave like one with 
flexible prices, as it might under particular monetary rules.  Thus, under the sticky price 
hypothesis, the government purchases multiplier and the output effect of factor supply 
vary over time, and might be different during this recession than in previous years. 
Section V examines three events that happened during this recession, for the 
purpose of determining whether the outcomes confirm the paradoxes rather than showing   3
significant resource reallocation among competing uses of the economy’s output.  Those 
events are: the labor supply shifts associated with the annual seasons, the minimum wage 




II.  A Simple Model for Comparing Flexible and Sticky Price Outcomes 
 
The economic mechanisms behind the government spending multiplier and other 
Keynesian paradoxes can be illustrated in a variant of the Sidrauski (1967) model without 
capital.
1  Because the economic issues to be examined relate to factor supply and nominal 
prices, my version of the model distinguishes leisure or work time from commodities, 
and includes a numeraire commodity called “money.”  Nt denotes aggregate work hours 
over the tth time interval (an interval might, for example, be a month, or a week).  In 
order to consider the effects of changes in one sector’s demand on the amount and 
composition of total output, I group the other goods in the economy into two categories: 
C and G.  As my primary example, Ct denotes the real quantity of privately purchased 
goods during time interval t, and Gt the real quantity of public purchases. 
  There is a representative consumer and worker with preferences u(ct,gt,mt/Pt,nt,t) 
that potentially vary over time.  I consider the limit of continuous time, so mt denotes the 
quantity of money held by the consumer at moment t, Pt the price level (mt/Pt is the real 
money balance), lower case nt denotes the consumer’s labor at moment t, and ct and gt 
denote the consumer’s rate of consumption of the two consumption goods.  For 
simplicity, and to be transparent about the meaning of “demand shifts” over time, I 
assume that the utility flow is additively separable in all four goods: 
                                                 
1 As regards the model tastes and technology, the model above is a continuous-time extension of Eggertson 
(2009, 2010) and Woodford (2010) in which seasonal cycles and the money stock appear explicitly, a 
richer time pattern of taste shocks is modeled, and the production function is potentially concave.  For 
simplicity, I omit one feature of Eggertson (2010): his paper has a rate of time preference that varies 
stochastically over time, which he analyzes by considering a linear approximation of the model in the 
neighborhood of the steady state.   4
(, , / ,,) () () ( / ) () tc g m tn ucgm Pnt u c u g u m P u n α γ =+ + −, with uc′, un′, un″ > 0 and uc″, um″ 
< 0.
2  The flow is discounted over time at constant time preference rate ρ. 
  The preference parameter time paths αt ∈ [0,1] and γt ∈ [0,1] model fluctuations 
over time in the demand for c and supply of labor as, for example, they vary over the 
academic year and the Christmas season.  Normalizing one unit of time to be a calendar 
year, we have αt = αt-1 and γt = γ t-1 for all t, which means that the seasonal preference 
cycle is the same every year.  I also assume that α and γ are piecewise continuous 
functions of time.  For simplicity, the preferences for m and g are constant.   
Pt denotes the time t nominal price of Ct and Gt.  Aggregate consistency requires 
that ct = Ct, nt = Nt, gt = Gt, and mt = Mt, where Mt is the aggregate supply of money at 
date t.  The details are not considered here, but Ct and Gt can be interpreted as composite 
commodities, produced by many independent firms (see Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987, 
and many subsequent papers using the Dixit-Stiglitz setup).  Under this interpretation, the 
output of each firm contributes to the composite symmetrically, but as imperfect 
substitutes with each of the others. 
Aggregate production F(N) is strictly increasing and weakly concave in the 
amount of labor N:  
 
 () tt t CGF N + =  (1) 
 
Firms hire date t labor at nominal rate Wt, and workers receive rate (1-τt)Wt, with the 
amount  τtWtNt going to the government as nominal labor income tax revenue.  The 
government finances the remainder of its spending with a lump sum tax Lt (or, if τtWtNt > 
Gt, a lump sum transfer). 
With short duration loans available at date t at instantaneous nominal interest rate 
Rt, and money balances earning no interest, the representative consumer has the time zero 
intertemporal budget constraint: 
                                                 
2 um(x) does not have to be a monotone function: there could be a finite real balance x
* at which point 
consumers are satiated.  Nor do I rule out the possibility that labor supply is, say, quite inelastic with 
respect to the real wage.   5
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where Rtmt is the nominal flow opportunity cost of holding money balances in the amount 
mt.  For now, I assume that the second consumption good g is publicly provided (financed 
with some combination of lump sum and labor income taxes), so that it does not appear 
directly in (2). 
The consumer’s demand for private commodities and supply of labor satisfy two 
first order conditions equating marginal rates of substitution in utility to Rt and 
(1-τt)Wt,/Pt, respectively.  When combined with the aggregate consistency conditions, 

















































where dots indicate derivatives with respect to time.  Equation (5) is the familiar 
consumption Euler equation because the left hand side is the growth rate of marginal 
utility (times minus one) and the right hand side is the difference between the nominal 
interest rate (see equation (3)) and the inflation rate. 
The profits of the representative firm are nonnegative if and only if: 
 
 () 0 tt t t PF N WN − ≥  (6) 
   6
If each firm could change its price continuously, optimal price setting from the 












where μ ≥ 1 is a constant reflecting the possibility that the representative firm may face a 
downward sloping demand for its product (that is, a gap between marginal revenue and 
Pt) and mark up its price accordingly. 
 
Definition (Flexible Price Equilibrium)  Given piecewise continuous time paths 
0 {, ,,,} tt t t t t GMταγ
∞
= , and a pair of scalars (μ,ρ), a flexible price equilibrium is a list of 
time paths  0 {, ,,,} ttt t t t CNWRP
∞
=  satisfying equations (1), (3), (4), (5), and (7) for all t ≥ 0.
3 
 
In order to capture the sluggish price response that might occur with staggered 
price setting, I assume that the aggregate price index adjusts gradually to the level at 
which marginal revenue equals marginal cost for the representative firm, with the 
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 (8) 
As shown by Calvo (1983), the second order differential equation (8) is the reduced form 
of a staggered price setting model in which firms alternate in their opportunity to set 
prices, at which time a firm sets its price equal to a weighted geometric average of its 
own marginal cost (times the markup factor μ) and its competitors’ prices anticipated to 
prevail until the price can be revised again. 
Having committed to their price, firms have the choice of whether to produce or 
not at any time t, but otherwise must produce whatever their time t customers demand at 
the given price Pt. 
 
                                                 
3 Throughout the paper, I assume that Gt is close enough to zero that a flexible price equilibrium exists (that 
is, I rule out cases in which Gt ever exceeds the market economy’s production capacity).  See Baxter and 
King (1993) for an early quantitative study of fiscal policy in general equilibrium.   7
Definition (Sticky Price Equilibrium)    Given piecewise continuous time paths 
0 {, ,,,} tt t t t t GMταγ
∞
= and three scalars (P0,μ,ρ), a sticky price equilibrium is a list of time 
paths  0 {, , ,,} ttt t t t CNWRP
∞
=  satisfying equations (1), (3), (4), (5), (8), and the inequality (6) 
for all t ≥ 0. 
 
In order to examine the paradox of toil and the government spending multiplier, it 
helps to define a steady state seasonal cycle that would be an equilibrium for the sticky 
price model when the preference and policy impulses were themselves in a seasonal 
steady state. 
 
Definition (Steady State Seasonal Cycle)  Given time paths  0 {,, } tt t t MG τ
∞
= for the 
money stock, government consumption, and the marginal tax rate that do not vary year-
over-year, and given time paths  0 {,} tt t αγ
∞
= and a pair of scalars (μ,ρ), a steady state 
seasonal cycle is a list of time paths  0 {, ,,,} ttt t t t CNWRP
∞
=  that are a sticky price 
equilibrium and do not vary year-over-year.  On the time interval [0,1], the consumption, 
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After substitution from the first order conditions (3) and (4), the two differential 
equations included in the definition are the sticky price equilibrium consumption Euler 
equation (5) and price adjustment equation (8).  By assumption, none of the impulse 
variables vary year-over-year, so the state of the system (9) is exactly the same at time 1 
as it was at time 0, so the steady state seasonal cycle beyond time 1 satisfies 
11 , ttt t CCNN −− == , etc.
4 
                                                 
4 When the impulse variables are constant over time – both within and across years – a steady state seasonal 
cycle is just the more familiar “steady state”: a list of scalars (,, ,,) CNWRPso that  the time paths 
0 { ,,, , } tttt t t CC NN WW RR PP
∞
= ==== = are a sticky price equilibrium given 
0 {, , ,,} tt t t t t GG MM ττ αα γγ
∞
= == = = = .   8
This paper considers the effects of short run changes in the policy variables M, G, 
τ, so I do not assume that they are constant year-over-year.  However, for convenience I 
do assume that, for large t, the time paths  0 {, ,} tt t t GMτ
∞
=  approach time paths that are 
constant year-over-year so that sticky price equilibrium paths eventually approach 
seasonal steady state paths.  Thus, a sticky price equilibrium is the solution to the 
boundary value problem (10): 
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where  0 {} tt C
∞
=  is the steady state seasonal cycle for private consumption corresponding to 





III.  Analytics of the Multiplier and Other Paradoxes 
Prices are a means by which consumer purchases reflect factor market conditions: 
in the flexible price model (7) prices always reflect marginal cost, whereas the sticky 
price model has them move only gradually in the direction of marginal cost.  Propositions 
1-3 contrast comparative statics of flexible and sticky price equilibria, showing how 
government spending and marginal tax rates affect total spending to degrees that depends 
on the price mechanism.  Simply put, supply does not matter at the margin in the sticky 
price model, so that temporary changes in marginal tax rates do not affect outcomes, and 
temporary increases in government spending do not run into supply constraints. 
Seasonal cycles in the preference parameters induce seasonal cycles for labor and 
consumption that depend on whether prices are sticky or flexible, unless the cycles for 
tastes are exactly offset by cycles in monetary or fiscal impulses.  Proposition 4 shows 
how the seasonal cycles in the flexible and sticky price models are different in the same   9
way, and for exactly the same reason, that the fiscal policy comparative statics are 
different in the two models. 
 
Proposition 1 (Crowding Out) For  any  t ≥ 0, lump-sum tax financed government 
purchases Gt, holding constant government purchase at all other dates, reduce private 
spending Ct in the flexible price equilibrium and have no effect on private spending in the 
sticky price equilibrium.  Gt increases total period t spending in both cases. 
The comparative statics dCt/dGt in the flexible and sticky price cases are, 
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Proposition 2 (Labor Supply)   For any t ≥ 0, a reduction in the labor income tax 
rate τt,  financed with a change in lump-sum taxes Lt and holding constant the tax rate at 
all other dates, increases labor usage Nt and private spending Ct in the flexible price 
equilibrium and has no effect on employment and private spending in the sticky price 
equilibrium. 
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Proof  The flexible price version of the proofs is straightforward, given the time-
separable determination of equilibrium quantities.  The flexible price equilibrium amount 
of date t labor usage, Nt, is implicitly defined by a single algebraic equation:   
() () () ( 1 )() tn t tc t t t t uN uF N G F N μγ α τ ′′ ′ =− − .  The formal sticky price model proof 
shown in the Appendix is based on the system of differential equations (10), but can be 
simply understood by noting that the system has the price level and the inflation rate as 
its only state variables, so the only way that Gt or τt can affect Pt is by affecting the time 
path of marginal costs prior to date t.  The marginal costs prior to date t depend on the 
amount consumed and worked prior to date t, and these behaviors are linked to date t   10
fiscal policies through the household intertemporal budget constraint, but the lifetime 
wealth effects of Gt or τt are negligible by assumption that the policy change is 
temporary.
5 
   
The limiting case of constant consumption preferences α = 1 and extremely 
sluggish price adjustment λ Æ 0 helps to illustrate the proofs of Proposition 1 and 2.  As 
λ gets small, the system (10) evolves more slowly so that the inflation rate and the 















Equation (14) can be inverted to calculate the private “demand” for goods C(M/P), which 
is decreasing in its own price P relative to money.  The shape of this demand function 
depends only on three components of the utility function: ρ, uc′, and um′. 
  The demand for goods C(M/P) can be used to begin a calculation of the demand 
for labor at any point in time, because, as long as profits are non-negative, enough labor 
must be used to satisfy the demand C(M/P) + G: 
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Figure 1 graphs labor usage Nt on its horizontal axis, and the real (pre-tax) wage rate on 
the vertical axis.  Over the range in which profits are non-negative, sticky price 
equilibrium labor demand does not depend on the real wage rate and the equilibrium 
amount of labor usage does not vary with labor supply preferences γt, or with the 
marginal tax rate τt.  The government can add to distortions by raising marginal tax rates, 
                                                 
5 The propositions describe both an unanticipated fiscal policy change (that is, one occurring at time zero) 
and an anticipated fiscal policy change (that is, one occurring well after time zero).  As noted by Woodford 
(2010), a permanent increase in government purchases would markedly reduce private consumption, even 
when prices are sticky.  A long-lived, but less than permanent, increase in government consumption would 
reduce private consumption in the short run by something in between that amount and the zero crowd-out 
reported in Proposition 1 for a momentary increase in the sticky price model.   11
imposing minimum wage rules, etc., and, as long as the price level is fixed and profits are 
non-negative, have no effect on labor usage.  Labor market conditions only affect wage 
rates paid by employers and received by employees. 
In the flexible price model, prices adjust in response to the various impulses.  
Producers raise prices in response to an increase in government demand, and this induces 
the private sector to economize on its spending.  At a given employment level, an 
improvement in labor market distortions reduces the amount employers pay for their 
labor – regardless of whether output prices are fixed or flexible – and in the flexible price 
model producers pass on the cost savings to their customers in the form of lower prices.  
Producers lower their prices knowing that consumers will demand more, so the producers 
use more labor in order to have that additional production. 
For the purposes of characterizing the flexible price equilibrium, the sticky price 
labor demand curve (15) is not particularly helpful, because the curve would have to be 
shifted for every instance of price adjustment.  The flexible price analysis features a labor 
demand or marginal productivity schedule for which movements along include the output 
price adjustments.  The flexible price labor demand curve drawn in Figure 1 is therefore 
the inverse of equation (7) rather than the inverse (15) of equation (1) used to represent 
the sticky price equilibrium.  In this case, Figure 1 clearly shows that labor distortions 
reduce flexible price equilibrium employment (see also the proof of Proposition 2). 
  In both the flexible and sticky price models, Propositions 1 and 2 are closely 
related because the crowding out of activity in one sector as a result of demand in another 
is about factor supply.  In both models, factors of production are needed to satisfy 
government demand, but only in the flexible price model does competition for factors 
cause the private sector to economize on its factor usage. 
  The aggregate effects of unemployment benefit payments financed with lump sum 
taxes are one application of Proposition 2, because unemployment benefits are a transfer 
payment with positive (implicit) marginal labor income tax rates.
6  Economists debate the 
magnitude of the incentive effects, but they generally agree that unemployment benefits 
normally reduce aggregate employment.  But the 2008-9 recession has been said to be 
                                                 
6 The marginal tax rate is positive because unemployment benefits cease once the beneficiary becomes 
employed, which affects the beneficiary’s tradeoff between unemployment and employment (Meyer, 
1990).   12
abnormal in this regard: as one economist put it, “Traditionally, many economists have 
been leery of prolonged unemployment benefits because they can reduce the incentive to 
seek work. But that should not be a concern now because jobs remain so scarce.”
7  One 
way to rationalize this view: the economy is often adequately described by the flexible 
price model, but during a recession the sticky price model offers the better description.  
Proposition 2 shows how, in this case, the payment of unemployment benefits would 
normally reduce aggregate employment, but would not reduce it during a recession.  This 
is why it is important to have empirical evidence on recession-era aggregate effects of 
labor supply. 
 
Proposition 3 (Tax Contraction)  Assuming that the economy is on the upward 
sloping part of the Laffer curve, labor income tax financed government purchases Gt, t ≤ 
T, can reduce labor usage Nt and total spending Ct + Gt in the flexible price equilibrium 
but necessarily increase them in the sticky price equilibrium. 
 
Proof  By definition of “upward sloping part of the Laffer curve”, an increase in the 
labor income tax rate τ for a given amount of government purchases requires budget 
balance via a decrease in lump sum taxes, rather than an increase or no change.  Combine 
Proposition 1 with Proposition 2. 
 
  At first glance, a “stimulus” law that had the government purchase goods and 
services and finance those purchases with public debt would seem to be better described 
by Proposition 1 than Proposition 3, because the former holds marginal tax rates constant.  
However, in practice much “stimulus” spending raises marginal tax rate because the 
government purchases are targeted toward persons with low incomes.
8  In this case, 
Proposition 3 helps frame the debate about the aggregate effects of stimulus laws: if the 
recession economy is described by the sticky price model, then the incentive effects of 
stimulus spending do not matter and that spending does not crowd out private spending.  
In the flexible price model, stimulus spending crowds out private spending and may 
ultimately reduce aggregate labor usage. 
                                                 
7 As quoted by Eckholm (2009). 
8 Formally, a means test can be modeled by writing the government transfer L as a lump sum minus a linear 
function of labor income Wn.  Once substituted into the representative houshold’s intertemporal budget 
constraint (2), note that both the means test and labor income tax terms are linear functions of labor 
income, and interpret their combined coefficients as “the marginal tax rate.”  See Mulligan (2010a) for an 
instance from this recession when a means-tested transfer created very large marginal tax rates.   13
The government purchases multiplier of exactly one, and the exactly zero 
employment effect of labor market distortions help illustrate a number of paradoxes that 
arise in public policy discussions, but readers should recognize that other factors can push 
the multipliers up or down.  For example, the government purchases multiplier would be 
lower in both models if those purchases were close substitutes with private purchases 
(Barro, 1981, p. 1091 has such a model).  Depending on the future of government 
purchases and tax rates, the government purchases multiplier could be greater than one in 
both flexible price and sticky price models with capital to the degree that investment 
reacts in the short run to the anticipation of greater labor usage in the long run (Aiyagari, 
Christiano, and Eichenaum, 1992).  In a model of heterogenous preferences, government 
spending could have the additional effect of redistributing purchasing power from 
households with a strong preference for money balances to households with a weak 
preference, which would increase consumption demand at a given price.  Thus, additional 
government purchases or additional labor market distortions could actually increase 
private consumption spending in variations of the sticky price model. 
Because the magnitude of the government spending multiplier depends on the 
importance of supply and demand at the margin, the seasonal cycle is related to the 
multiplier.  In order to make the comparison more formally, it helps to define a “short 
season” analogous to the short duration fiscal policy shocks examined in Propositions 1-
3: 
Definition (Short Seasonal)  Let the money stock, government consumption, and 
marginal tax rates be constant within and across years.  There are two perpetually 
recurring alternating seasons of duration S and 1-S, with the first season commencing at 
time zero.  The preference parameters α and γ vary over the seasons, and are constant 
within seasons and constant year-over-year.  A short seasonal steady state is list of on-
season and off-season outcome values  ,,,, ,,,,, on on on on on off off off off off CNWRP CNWRP , 
respectively, such that the seasonal steady state cycle corresponding to the assumed 
impulses approaches, in the limit as S Æ 0, the time paths that take on the on-season 
values for the first fraction S of each year and the off-season values otherwise. 
 
In the flexible price model, consumption and labor at any point in time depend on 
both the preferences for consumption and the preferences for labor supply, according to 
the condition relating the marginal product of labor to the marginal rate of substitution:   14
() () () ( 1 )() tn t tc t t t t uN uF N G F N μγ α τ ′′ ′ =− − . But Proposition 4 shows how seasonal 
fluctuations in the sticky price model depend only on the seasonal for demand: 
 
Proposition 4 (Seasonal Supply and Demand)  The short seasonal fluctuations in 
consumption and labor depend only on the seasonal fluctuations in the consumption 
preference parameter, and not on the seasonal fluctuations in the labor preference 
parameter. 
 
Proof  Because the off-season is essentially the entire year, consumption and labor 
during the off-season are independent of the on-season taste parameters.  The proposition 
then follows from the no-jump condition for marginal utility:  () () on c on off c off uC uC αα ′′ = . 
 
The proof of Proposition 4 is related to the proof of Propositions 1 and 2: labor supply 
can only affect consumption through prices, which do not change in the short run of the 
sticky price model.  At the same time, prices are the means by which consumption 
demand changes are mitigated by crowding out, but prices do not change in the short run 
in the sticky price model. 
  Proposition 4 can be applied to a season like the summer when, for a short 
duration of time, a larger fraction of the population is available to work.  If the summer 
surge in labor supply is not offset by monetary or fiscal policy – and thereby prices have 
to fall in order for the market to absorb the additional workers – then there will be no 
labor supply surge in the sticky price model.  It can also be applied to a season like 
Christmas when the demand for goods is high for a short duration of time.  If the 
Christmas demand surge is not offset by monetary or fiscal policy – and thereby prices 
have to rise in order for the market to voluntarily supply the extra demand – then the 




IV.  Market Clearing Mechanisms 
 
  A rich literature has examined historical data in order to determine whether 
government purchases crowd out private purchases, and whether labor market distortions 
like taxes, minimum wages, and the moral hazards of unemployment insurance, reduce   15
labor usage and output (e.g., the studies cited in Moffitt, 2002).  But it is claimed that 
these empirical results are neither informative about the effects of fiscal policy during the 
2008-9 recession nor corresponding to comparative statics like those I examined in 
Propositions 1-3.  In particular, the stock of money might “normally” respond to changes 
in tastes, technology, and fiscal policy in the direction of stabilizing prices, in large part 
because of deliberate actions by the monetary authority, but Christiano, Eichenbaum, and 
Rebelo (2009) and others suggest that the usual kinds of monetary adjustments could not 
occur during this recession because of the “zero interest lower bound.”
9 
  It is true that monetary policy has historically responded to oil shocks (Bernanke, 
Gertler, and Watson, 1997), the seasonal cycle (Sharp, 1988), and other changes in 
economic fundamentals.  “Taylor rules” for targeting the federal funds rate prescribe such 
responses, and are said to characterize actual postwar monetary policy in the United 
States (Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 2000).  Thus, the historical effects of fiscal policy on 
private spending could be a combination of a direct effect – the comparative statics 
featured in my Proposition 1-2 are direct effects – and a possible indirect effect through 
changes in monetary policy.  For example, while an increase in the marginal tax rate τt 
does not directly reduce labor usage in the sticky price model (Proposition 2), it does 
create “inflationary pressures,” and the monetary authority might have reacted in the past 
to those pressures by reducing the money stock below what it would have been.
10  
Because less money means less consumption and labor in the sticky price model, a higher 
marginal tax rate could reduce labor usage in the sticky price model through this 
mechanism.  If the effects of fiscal policy on the money stock were enough to fully 
neutralize inflationary pressures created by fiscal policy, then fiscal policy would have 
the same effects in the fixed and flexible price models. 
  It is also true that money markets behaved quite differently during the 2008-9 
recession than they had in the past.  For example, the federal funds rate throughout 2009 
was close to zero and, contrary to prior years, well above what the Taylor rule prescribed 
(Rudebusch, 2009).  For years, the amount of reserves of depository institutions held with 
                                                 
9 In this regard, McGrattan and Ohanian’s (2008) analysis of the World War II multiplier is especially 
relevant because short term government securities also had near zero yields at that time. 
10 In the context of my model, inflationary (deflationary) “pressure” means a price level that is less (greater) 
than the representative firm’s marginal revenue product of labor divided by the nominal wage rate, 
respectively.  By equation (8), the price level is rising (falling) and the inflation rate is falling (rising).   16
the Federal Reserve system corresponded closely to the amount of required reserves, but 
in late 2008 excess reserves increased by a factor of 400 in a matter of four months (at the 
same time the fed funds rate fell to zero, see http://research.stlouisfed.org/).  During those 
same four months, consumer prices fell four percent (that is, deflation at a 12 percent 
annual rate, see www.bls.gov). 
Thus, it is unlikely that either monetary policy or other money market events even 
approximately eliminated deflationary pressures during the 2008-9 recession, and 
unlikely that they would offset any change in those pressures that might have been 
created by fiscal policy, or changes in tastes and technology, during the recession.   
Perhaps this monetary state of affairs occurred because a zero lower bound on the fed 
funds rate,
11 but in any case it suggests that the money-stock constant comparative statics 
examined in my Propositions 1-3 would better describe the effects of shocks to labor 
market distortions and spending during the recession than it would during the previous 
years.  It also suggests that evidence on the effects of changes in supply and demand 
during the recession would be especially valuable for determining whether the fixed or 
flexible price model better describes the recession-era effects of supply and demand 
shocks. 
  The “sticky” versus “flexible” price dichotomy has received much attention in 
macroeconomic theory over the years, and that attention has spawned a number of 
empirical studies of whether actual prices are sticky (Davis and Hamilton, 2004; 
Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008).  However, the real issue here is whether something in 
the economy operates to reallocate output among competing uses in response to changes 
in tastes, technology, or public policy.  For the purpose of applying the paradoxes, the 
real question is whether public spending somehow significantly crowds out private 
spending and whether consumers somehow consume significantly less when the 
producers of the consumer goods find it more difficult to hire. 
Monetary policy is not the only such mechanism.  For example, the U.S. 
government purchased military equipment during World War II, while it also put controls 
on consumer prices.  In a flexible price world, one private sector response would be an 
                                                 
11 As noted by Curdia and Woodford (2010) and Ohanian (2010), the nominal interest rate in the model’s 
consumption Euler equation is not the same as the fed funds rate, and the gap between the two may well 
have changed during the recession because financial intermediaries were under stress.   17
increase in the prices of private sector goods (autos, refrigerators, etc.) that would be 
produced with many of the same resources used by the military equipment sector.  In 
fact, the government ordered that former consumer durable factories be converted to 
military equipment production, and rationed many of the consumer durables that were put 
out of production.  The end result was that government purchases significantly reduced 
private spending, which is a result that accords with the flexible price model rather than 
the sticky price model (Barro, 1987). 
Or consider an increase in the minimum wage that raises employers’ costs of 
hiring.  In the flexible output price model, consumers would ultimately purchase a lesser 
volume of goods because the producers of those goods pass their added employment 
costs into output prices.  But in reality other mechanisms could produce this response, 
even (especially) if output prices were fixed.  For example, prior to the minimum wage 
increase, a fraction of producers might have had a price that barely covered their variable 
costs, and the minimum wage increase pushes them to cease production all together.  To 
the degree that the goods going out of production were imperfect substitutes in utility 
with the remaining goods, total production and labor usage would fall. 
In summary, the government spending multiplier depends critically on whether 
factor market costs are somehow passed through to consumers, and whether this pass-
through occurs during recessions.  Pass-through can occur through a variety of 
mechanisms, so the empirical question is whether private consumption falls when tastes, 
technology, or fiscal policy changes during a recession affect the factors costs of the 
firms producing those goods. 
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V.  The Great Recession Economy Resembles a Flexible Price Economy 
 
A contribution of this paper is therefore to consider three events that happened 
during this recession, and examine whether the outcomes confirm the paradoxes rather 
than showing significant resource allocation among competing uses of the economy’s 
output.  Those events are: the labor supply shifts associated with the annual seasons, the 
minimum wage hike of July 24, 2009, and the collapse of residential construction 
spending.  The events are used to test the hypothesis that factor supply expands output, 
both at the industry and aggregate levels. 
 
V.A.  The Seasonal Cycle Proceeded as Usual 
  Gauti Eggertsson (2010a, p. 1) poses the hypothetical question “What happens [if] 
everyone wakes up [one day] with exactly the same idea: Let’s go out and look for some 
more work?”  He suggests that partial equilibrium answers to this question are highly 
misleading, and that the answer is that aggregate employment may fall, at least if the 
macroeconomy were caught in a liquidity trap, much like the one purported to 
characterize the U.S. economy during the recession of 2008-9. 
  The end of the academic year is remarkably similar to the question posed 
(Mulligan, 2009).  Schools vary somewhat on the exact day that their academic years 
end, but during the month of May academic years end rather abruptly around the United 
States, and many of the teenage students storm into the job market to look for work.  
Academic years begin just as abruptly in late August and early September. 
  To see how the actual labor market responds to such an event, consider the United 
States Census Bureau’s monthly household survey, whose employment totals have been 
summarized by the Bureau as national aggregates for each of several age groups.  I have 
used their seasonally unadjusted series for persons aged 16-19 to calculate monthly 
employment deviations from each year’s December to December trend.  Those deviations 
are averaged for the five years 2003-7 prior to the current recession, and the April-  19
October result displayed as the black series in Figure 2.
12  For example, a value of 1357 
for July means that July teen employment was 1,357,000 above the December to 
December trend, on average for 2003-7.  Figure 3 shows the same calculation for total 
employment (all ages 16+).  Figure 4 shows teen unemployment. 
Teen employment is sharply higher in June, and sharply higher again in July, for a 
total April-July increase of 1,649,000 teen employees.  Figure 3 shows how total 
employment also increases significantly, so the teen rush into the labor market does not 
merely reallocate jobs from older persons to teens.   
The summer teen employment surge is largely a consequence of seasonality in 
supply, not demand.
13  To see this, note that a pure summer demand surge would draw 
teens into the labor market with low teen summer unemployment, high summer real 
wages, and low summer unemployment among persons not enrolled in school during the 
academic year.
14  Figure 4 shows that, in fact, teen unemployment spikes in June as the 
labor market absorbs more than one million teens.  Unemployment of persons aged 25 
and older (not shown in the figures) is high throughout the summer, peaking in July at 
almost 700,000 persons above trend.  Median nominal and real weekly wages for teens 
are often at their lowest of the year in the third quarter (July – September), and 
presumably hourly wages are even lower due to longer teen summer work weeks.       
These patterns reverse when the academic year ends. 
Also consistent with the supply interpretation, Mulligan (2010b) shows how age 
groups with the largest summer log employment and log unemployment spikes are those 
with the greatest school enrollment rates during the academic year, and the summer log 
employment spike may even be negative for groups with near zero school enrollment.  
Nor do many of the summer jobs for teens appear to be in industries that have a 
significant spike in labor demand, because 77% of those jobs are in industries that expand 
their employment of persons aged 25-34 less than two percent, if at all.
15 
                                                 
12 The prior literature on teen summer employment has used April as its academic year benchmark (U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009). 
13 For the purposes of testing the fixed versus flexible price models, it is not necessary to assume that the 
summer surge is only the result of supply (see Mulligan, 2010b, for a formal analysis of this point). 
14 The hypothetical demand surge would also have to be quite large – about as large as doubling the size of 
the nation’s military in a mere two months – because the end result is about a million new jobs for teens. 
15 These are based on calculations using the May, July, and September 2005 Current Population survey.  
The top industry hiring teens in the summer was “arts, entertainment, and recreation” (accounting for 19   20
  The recession years of 2008 and 2009 were no different in this regard: the 
academic year came to an end as it usually does, and got started again in the fall.  Figures 
2, 3, and 4 display series for each of 2008 and 2009 in blue and red, respectively.   
Consistent with the flexible price model, both teen employment and total employment 
increased significantly at the beginning of the summer, and fell back to trend when 
summer ended.  The summer teen employment spike is a bit smaller in 2008 and 2009 
than it was in prior years, and the summer total employment spike is a bit larger in 
2009.
16  These data provide no support for the sticky price model hypothesis that the 
annual rush of teens into a recession labor market would fail to increase employment, and 
no support for Eggertsson’s hypothesis that it would decrease employment. 
 
V.B.  The 2009 Minimum Wage Hike Reversed the Trend for Part-time Work, and 
Further Reduced Low-Skill Full-time Employment 
  Taken literally, the variable τ in my model is the labor income tax rate because it 
enters the government budget constraint.  However, with an adjustment of the lump sum 
tax term L that does not affect any of the model’s first order conditions, τ can be 
interpreted as anything that drives a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and 
the marginal product of labor, or anything that shifts the marginal rate of substitution in 
the direction of less labor supply.  Under any of the interpretations, an increase in the 
labor market distortion τ, such as an increase in a binding minimum wage rate, raises 
employer costs.  The flexible price model says that the higher costs are passed on to 
consumers, who demand less product from those employers, and the employers reduce 
their labor usage.  The sticky price model predicts no labor usage effect. 
  In July 2007, the federal minimum hourly wage was increased for the first time in 
10 years, to $5.85 from $5.15. It was increased again a year later to $6.55, and increased 
yet again on July 24, 2009 to $7.25 (Dept. of Labor, 2009).  Consumer prices were 
                                                                                                                                                 
percent of the teen summer jobs), which had no change in the number of persons aged 25-34 employed.  
The second industry (also accounting for 19 percent) is “accommodation and food services,” which actually 
cut its employment of persons aged 25-34 by 4 percent during the summer. 
16 Mulligan (2010b) analyzes these patterns over a longer time frame, and for various age groups, 
regressing the summer log employment spike on a smooth function of time and a dummy 
variable for recessions, finding no statistically or economically significant difference between the 
summer spike in recessions and the summer spike in other years.  He also finds that, contrary to the sticky 
price theory, the Christmas demand shock does not have larger employment impacts during recessions.   21
generally rising prior to the summer of 2008, but fell 2.1 percent from July 2008 to July 
2009.
17  Thus, the real minimum wage hike was large in July 2009, and began from the 
highest base, and is therefore expected to have the largest effect on the costs of firms that 
employ low-hourly-wage workers. 
Part-time and teen employees are especially likely to have hourly wages near the 
federal minimum.  Table 1 displays the number of persons who are paid an hourly wage 
at or below the federal minimum wage, expressed as a percentage of employment, for 
selected demographic groups reported by the Census Bureau for 2008, the last full year 
that the federal minimum wage would be below $7.25.  The percentage is 6.0 for all 
employees aged 16-24, and is presumably even greater for the narrower group of teens 
(ages 16-19).  Part-time employees also have about a six percent incidence of earning at 
or below the federal minimum.  Full-time employees, especially men working full-time, 
were quite unlikely to earn minimum wage.  Based on the patterns shown in Table, the 
July 2009 federal minimum wage hike is expected to affect, if anything, the employment 
of teens and part-time workers, and to have little effect on the number of adults employed 
full-time. 
  Figure 5’s red series displays seasonally adjusted national part-time employment 
by month, from the Census Bureau’s monthly household survey.  Prior to July 2009, part-
time employment increased by about 3 million during the recession.  July 2009 was the 
peak level of part-time employment.  In order to investigate the possibility that the July 
2009 hike stopped further increases in part-time employment, and perhaps affected other 
employment categories, I estimated an auto-regressive monthly model of national part-
time and full-time employment per capita for each of twelve demographic groups 
distinguished according to race, gender, and age (white vs. nonwhite, male vs. female, 
and 16-19 vs. 20-54 vs. 55 and over): 
                                                 
17 The July CPI (NSA) for all items was 219.964 and 215.351 in 2008 and 2009, respectively 
(www.bls.gov/cpi).   22
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where PTit, FTit , and POPit denote demographic group i’s month t part-time employment, 
full-time employment, and population, respectively, and the a’s,  β’s,  b’s and δ’s are 
regression coefficients.  Demographic group i = 0 is comprised of prime-aged (ages 20-
54) white males.  Each demographic group’s two per capita not-seasonally-adjusted 
employment series
18 were separately seasonally adjusted by taking the residual from 
regressions of log per capita employment on twelve month dummies over the fifteen year 
period 1993 – 2007.  Using the seasonally adjusted series, I estimated the model (16) 
over the period January 2004 – July 2009.  Holding fixed the post-hike time series for 
population and the number of full-time positions held by prime-aged males,
19 I used the 
model to dynamically forecast part-time and full-time employment for each demographic 
group for August 2009 through December 2010 (by construction, the full-time forecast 
for prime-aged males coincides with the actual).  The aggregate deviation of the part-time 
predictions from the actual was added to the red series in Figure 5 to arrive at the 
aggregate part-time prediction shown as Figure 5’s solid blue series.
20 
  After falling 9.3 million during the recession through July 2009, aggregate full-
time employment fell another 1.8 million by the end of the year, and still remained below 
July 2009 levels at the end of 2010.  Some people laid off from their full-time jobs likely 
                                                 
18 Census Bureau (various issues).  CPS Monthly Tables A-13 and A-18. 
19 Table 1 reported that only 0.6 percent of all full-time employed men were hourly workers paid at or 
below the federal minimum; presumably the percentage among prime-aged (ages 20-54) full-time 
employed men was even lower. 
20 The aggregate of my seasonally adjusted actual part-time employment series is slightly different from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ seasonally-adjusted aggregate; BLS does not report seasonally adjusted series 
for specific demographic groups.   23
had trouble finding another suitable full-time job, and some of them may be working 
part-time while they search.
21  Part-time jobs pay less than full-time jobs — even on an 
hourly basis — so some employers may also be using part-time employees to accomplish 
tasks where they previously might have used full-time jobs.  Consistent with these 
stories, my estimates of the pre-hike regression model (16) predict that part-time 
employment would have continued to increase during the second half of 2009 because, 
prior to the hike, part-time employment tended to increase with full-time job losses.  For 
example, the part-time regression (16) for prime-aged white women has estimates 
β = 0.18, b0 + b1 = 0.07, and δ0 + δ1 = -0.50, so that a persistent reduction in their own 
(prime-aged male) full-time employment was associated with more (less) of their own 
part-time employment, respectively.
22 
The actual and predicted series depart dramatically beginning in September 2009, 
with actual part-time employment 1.2 million below predicted part-time employment by 
December, and averaging 975,000 part-time positions below predicted over the months 
August 2009 – December 2010.  One reason to attribute much of the gap between actual 
and predicted part-time employment to the July 24, 2009 minimum wage hike is that, as 
noted above, the real federal minimum wage was substantially different after July 2009 
than it was before, but not expected to significantly affect the full-time employment of 
prime-aged males that are the basis for the forecasting model.  Moreover, my forecasting 
model (16) permits me to decompose the aggregate gap by demographic group, with the 
findings matching the theory.  Figure 6 is a scatter diagram comparing percentage gaps 
between predicted and actual after July 2009 to first quartile hourly earnings in 2008,
23 
for six demographic groups distinguished by age and employment status.  The three 
lowest wage groups – the groups expected to have the largest employment impact – are 
                                                 
21 To the extent that part-time employment rises during recessions as terminated full-time employees took 
part-time employment with different employers, this by itself suggests that, contrary to the sticky price 
model, part-time employers increase employment and output during a recession in response to an additional 
supply of part-time workers. 
22 An early version of this paper arrived at a similar aggregate part-time forecast merely by fitting an 
aggregate part-time employment model, with full-time employment as the only independent variable, over 
the months December 2007 through July 2009. 
23  2008 first quartile hourly earnings are calculated from respondents to the March 2009 CPS who reported 
positive hours, earnings, and weeks worked, and zero self-employment earnings in 2008.  2008 workers are 
considered “full-time” if in full-time positions for at least 75 percent of the weeks they worked in 2008, and 
part-time otherwise.   24
the ones with the largest (negative) estimated impacts, with their impact rank among 
groups identical to their rank in terms of first quartile earnings.  The three highest wage 
groups have estimated employment impacts of essentially zero. 
The 829,000 estimated employment effect of the federal minimum wage hike 
(975,000 part-time and -146,000 full-time positions) is consistent with the flexible price 
model.  For a back-of-the-envelope calculation that follows the economic model 
presented above, assume that all types of labor are substitutes in production (i.e., the 
cross-price elasticities of labor demand are positive), and a fraction ω << 1 of the 
workforce would have worked at a wage between $7.25 and $6.55 if the minimum wage 
had remained constant.  Given the assumptions that types of labor are substitutes, and that 
the fraction ω is small, the short run own wage elasticity of labor demand for that group 
of ω workers is between -∞ and the wage elasticity of overall labor demand, depending 
on the degree to which various types of labor are substitutes.  As of July 2009, the 
Economic Policy Institute (2009) estimated that 2.8 million people – 2.0 percent of the 
July 2009 workforce of 139.8 million – earned less than $7.25 per hour.  The wages of 
some of those 2.8 million people would not be covered by the new minimum of $7.25 
because they did seasonal work, received tips, or worked in some other job not covered 
by the law.  Other employers may succeed in changing the nature of the affected jobs 
(e.g., reducing the amount of “free” training provided) so that worker productivity would 
rise with the new minimum.  For these reasons, the number of jobs ultimately covered by 
the hike would be more like 1 – 2 million rather than the full 2.8 million earning less than 
$7.25.  Assuming that aggregate production is Cobb-Douglas in total labor, with labor’s 
share 0.7, the flexible-price theoretical short run employment impact of raising the 
minimum wage from $6.55 to $7.25 would be between 0.3 million and 2.0 million.
24 
 
V.C.  Housing Investment Crowds Out Non-Residential Construction 
  In the sticky price model, a demand increase in one sector increases output in that 
sector (say, the public sector), without reducing output in other sectors because the 
competition for factors of production is not passed into output prices that would 
                                                 
24 The short run wage elasticity of total labor demand would be -4 if the production function were Cobb-
Douglas with labor share equal to 0.75.  I assume that most of the ω workers with wage below $7.25 had 
wage at or below $6.55.   25
otherwise cause production to be reallocated to the demanded sector (see Proposition 1).  
For the same reason, a reduction in demand in one sector would not cause the other 
sectors to produce more. 
The private residential and nonresidential building sectors are an interesting case 
study, because the demand for housing surged 2000-2005, and collapsed thereafter.   
Admittedly, looking at the economy as residential versus nonresidential is not the same as 
looking at it as public versus private, but the former gives us some information about how 
different sectors are connected through factor markets, and this connection is at the heart 
of the crowding out hypothesis.  In fact, measuring the effects of residential building on 
non-residential building offers a tough test of the crowding out hypothesis because the 
housing collapse left so many unemployed and, depending on the degree to which factors 
employed in building sectors (residential and non-residential) are substitutes for factors 
employed in the rest of the economy, crowding out by housing demand could largely 
occur in the rest of the economy, rather than the non-residential building sector that is my 
focus here. 
  Figure 7 displays quarterly real residential and real non-residential structures 
investment since 2000 Q1.
25  Non-residential investment remained low throughout the 
housing boom.  Both residential and non-residential investment turned at almost exactly 
the same time, in opposite directions.  Non-residential investment increased throughout 
2006, 2007, and 2008, while residential investment was collapsing. 
  The large reduction in the workforce that became apparent by 2009, not to 
mention tight credit, likely reduced the desired stock of non-residential buildings and this 
by itself would cut non-residential investment activity, so it helps to separate the effect of 
an increased supply of resources for non-residential investment from reduced demand.  I 
attempt to do so by examining the two investment series in a regression framework that 
includes measures of the business cycle. 
  I use quarterly data on male employment rates and per capital real structures 
investment from 1996Q1 through 2010Q3.
26  Each column of Table 2 reports estimates of 
                                                 
25 Figure 7 is reproduced and updated from Mulligan and Threinen (2008). 
26 I obtained quantity indices for residential and non-residential structures investment from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis’ NIPA Table 5.3.3 and mid-quarter population from their NIPA Table 2.1.  Based on 
the assumption that building factors would move between the two sectors on roughly a dollar-for-dollar   26
a time series regression with real per capita non-residential structures investment as the 
dependent variable.  The independent variables include a linear time trend, real per capita 
residential structures investment, and the log of the male employment rate.  In some of 
the specifications, lags of the independent variables are included in which case the table 
displays the sum of the coefficients estimated on all lags (including lag zero).
27  Both 
investment variables are measured in 2005 dollars, so a coefficient of -1 on the residential 
investment variable would be found if the only fluctuations in building activity were the 
substitution of building activity in one sector for the same amount of building activity in 
the other sector.  The log employment rate series was rescaled by multiplying by the 
1996Q1 – 2007Q4 average of the dependent variable: its coefficient can therefore be 
interpreted as an elasticity. 
Columns (1) and (2) differ only in terms of the estimation method – levels versus 
first-differences – and both report an economically and statistically significant negative 
relationship between structures investment in the two sectors.  The point estimates 
suggest that one hundred units more housing investment is associated with 30-32 units 
less non-residential structures investment, which is consistent with a significant amount 
of crowding out of one sector’s building by building in the other sector.  Column (3) 
omits any lags of the independent variables, but reports a similar negative relationship 
between the two sectors’ structures investment. 
Columns (1)-(3) use only data from before 2008, and it has been argued that 
crowding out would not occur during the recession, even while it occurred in years 
before.  As one way to examine this possibility, I estimated two least squares versions of 
each of Table 2’s columns (1) and (2), again using only the data prior to 2008, and then 
used those estimates to predict non-residential building through 2010Q3.  One version 
has the same independent variables as used in columns (1) and (2) of the Table.  The 
other version omits the housing investment variable, so that the difference between the 
two predictions can be interpreted as the expected effect of the housing crash on non-
                                                                                                                                                 
basis, I converted each sector’s quantity index series (which were equal to 100 in 2005) to 2005 dollars by 
multiplying the series by the sector’s 2005 nominal investment expenditure from BEA Table 5.3.5 (results 
are similar if investment is measured as the log of the per capita quantity index, rather than in chained 
dollars).  Male employment rates are used rather than overall employment rates to focus on the business 
cycle rather than secular changes in the propensity of women to work. 
27 Time-to-build and price measurement errors are good reasons to include lagged price terms in the 
investment regressions.   27
residential structures investment since 2007.  The predictions for non-residential 
structures investment were made by using the estimated coefficients (and, for the level 
specifications, adjusting the constant term so that the models exactly fit 2007Q4 non-
residential structures investment
28) and the actual data through 2010Q3 for housing 
investment and the male employment rate. 
The predictions are shown in Figures 8a and 8b, together with the actual 
investment series, with the vertical line to the left of 2008Q1 indicating the quarters that 
were excluded from the regressions used to make the predictions.  When the housing 
investment variable is ignored, non-residential building is predicted to drop all quarters 
(the black series in Figure 8a) or all quarters but one (the black series in Figure 8b) since 
2007.
29  In fact, non-residential building peaked in 2008Q2 and remained pretty flat 
through the end of the year.  The models including the housing investment variable (blue 
series in Figures 8a and 8b) correctly predict this pattern, as well as the actual sharp drop 
to begin 2009.  Overall, the models without housing investment consistently under-
predicts non-residential building whereas the predictions based on the housing investment 
variable are closer, having predictions on both sides of the actual series.  Figure 8a and 8b 
are inconsistent with the claim that crowding out disappeared during the recent recession. 
  Table 2’s columns (4) and (5) further explore the possibility that crowding out is 
different in recessions than other times by interacting the independent variables with a 
recession indicator.  One of the recession indicators is a dummy for the quarters since 
2007, and the other is an indicator for the quarters coded as recession by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research.  If crowding out were zero during a recession, then the 
coefficient on the housing investment interaction would be positive and equal in 
magnitude to the negative coefficient on the un-interacted housing investment term.   
Instead, the estimated coefficient on that interaction term is economically and statistically 
                                                 
28 The specifications without housing investment ignore crowding out even before 2008 and thereby grossly 
under-predict non-residential investment for 2007Q4 – my procedure of adjusting the constant allows the 
model to fit 2007Q4 in order to see whether crowding out is needed to predict the non-residential 
investment changes during the recession.  The adjustment of the constant for the specification including 
housing investment is quite small, because that model predicts 2007Q4 well. 
29 Each Figure 8a, 8b is based on two regressions.  Alternatively, each Figure could have been based on a 
single regression, with the “emp. only” prediction calculated by setting the employment coefficients to zero 
– this alternative calcalution turns out to be very similar to the “emp. only” series shown.   28
insignificant.  Thus, Table 2 is inconsistent with the claim that recessions have 
significantly less crowding out. 
 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
From a partial equilibrium perspective, it would be surprising if government 
spending did not crowd out at least some private spending, and that a reduction in factor 
supply did not result in less output.  Yet some “New Keynesian” models, not to mention 
much public policy commentary, claim that today’s economy has turned this partial 
equilibrium reasoning on its head, even while it might have been historically valid.   
Among other things, individual firms and the aggregate private sector are alleged to leave 
their production invariant to changes in factor supply conditions during this recession.  
This paper shows how the government spending multiplier and the “paradox of toil” are 
related in theory, and examines evidence from this recession on the output effects of 
factor supply. 
The academic year concluded twice during this recession, and both times over a 
million teens entered the labor market.  Well over a million of them found employment, 
and as a result total employment for the economy was significantly higher in July than it 
was in April.  This pattern reversed itself the two times that the academic year resumed 
during this recession.  The real federal minimum wage was hiked at the end of July 2009 
from an already high level relative to the CPI.  Employers of part-time workers appeared 
to respond by significantly cutting part-time employment after July 2009, despite the fact 
that part-time employment had trended strongly up prior to the hike.  The hike appears to 
have reduced nationwide employment by about 800,000 on average between August 
2009 and the end of 2010.  Finally, the collapse of housing construction served to shift 
resources into non-residential building. 
Despite the presence of perhaps the deepest recession of our lifetime, and nominal 
interest rates on government securities that were essentially zero, these three episodes 
show how factor markets seemed to behave as if output prices were flexible at the 
margin.  In particular, markets absorb an increased supply of factors of production – even 
during a recession like this one – and do so by increasing output.  The seasonal patterns   29
and minimum wage episode show this result at the aggregate level, while the minimum 
wage and housing episodes illustrate it at a sectoral level. 
This paper does not contain a numerical estimate of the government purchases 
multiplier.  However, its examination of data exclusively from the 2008-9 recession 
suggests that sectoral and aggregate employment and output vary with supply conditions 
in much the same way they did before the recession.  The results contradict Keynesian 
claims that the government purchases multiplier would be significantly greater during the 
recession than it was before 2008, suggesting instead that historical estimates of the 
effects of fiscal policies are informative about fiscal policy effects in more recent years.  
Moreover, the supply incentives created by government spending cannot be ignored 
merely because 2008 and 2009 were recession years; rather incentives mattered as much 
as ever.  Government purchases likely moved factors away from activities that would 
have supported private purchases.  Unemployment insurance, food stamps, and other 
expanding means-tested government programs likely reduced employment and output 
during this recession, in much the same way they did in years past. 
Nothing about my results implies that this recession was efficient, or that 
government spending necessarily reduces efficiency.  Indeed, my “flexible price model” 
includes a distortion in the output market (recall the parameter μ) and a distortion in the 
labor market (recall the parameter τ).
30  As noted by Woodford (2010), the presence of 
distortions by itself does not tell us whether government spending stimulates private 
spending, or how output responds at the margin to factor supply shifts. 
This is not to say that output prices were actually flexible during the recession, 
because producer entry and exit and a variety of other market mechanisms could have 
many of the qualitative effects of flexible prices.  Moreover, even if it were shown that 
output prices actually were flexible during this recession, that does not preclude the 
possibility that those prices would be inflexible in response to smaller shocks.  But, when 
it comes to this recession, models that feature sticky prices have been a poor description 
of actual events in the real economy. 
                                                 
30 Another theory is that labor market outcomes during this recession were inefficient as a result of rigid 
nominal wages.  My minimum wage findings are consistent with that theory, but my results for the seasons 
and for non-residential construction caution against going so far as assuming, as in “old Keynesian” 
models, that rigid nominal wages rendered supply irrelevant for determining market outcomes during the 
recession.   30
VII.  Appendix – Remainder of Proof of Proposition 1 
 
By definition, a equilibrium  0 {, , ,,} ttt t t t CNWRP
∞
=  corresponding to benchmark 
time paths  0 {, ,,,} tt t t t t GMταγ
∞
=  solves the boundary value problem (10).  The same time 
paths, with the exception that Nt is large enough to provide for the extra government 
demand at time t, solves the boundary value problem perturbed to have different values 
for G and τ at date t only.  To see this, note that the proposed solution has the same time 
path for the rate of change of the inflation rate (that is, the second derivative of lnPt with 
respect to time), except at moment t when it is greater by a finite amount (no matter how 
different are Gt and τt from their benchmark values).  With only a momentary finite 
change in the rate of change of the inflation rate from the benchmark equilibrium, the 
inflation rate itself, and the price level at time t, are also the same as in the benchmark 
equilibrium.  It follows that the proposed solution also has the same rate of growth for 
uc′(C) as the benchmark equilibrium, and thereby the same private consumption and 
uc′(C) as the benchmark equilibrium. 
 Table 1.  Hourly Workers at or Below the Federal Minimum Wage, 2008
Selected Groups of Wage & Salary Workers
Group Percentage who work hourly at or below Fed. Minimum Wage
Employed, Ages 16-24 6.0%
Employed Part-time, Ages 16+ 6.0%
Employed, Ages 16+ 1.7%
Employed Full-time Female, Ages 16+ 1.1%
Employed Full-time Male, Ages 16+ 0.6%
Source: Census Bureau.  Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey .
Numbers employed from Table A-18.
Numbers who work hourly at or below federal minimum wage from Table 44.Table 2.  Crowding Out of Real Inv. in Non-Res. Structures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
end sample: 2007Q4 2007Q4 2007Q4 2010Q3 2010Q3
estimation method: levels first diff. levels levels levels
no. of current & lagged terms: 44111
-0.32 -0.30 -0.29 -0.29 -0.24
(0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07)
8.05 8.05 2.23 2.22 4.80
(1.14) (2.00) (1.13) (1.14) (0.78)
recession measured as: N/A N/A N/A






time trend (constant in first diff.) 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
constant -13.6 N/A -3.4 -3.4 -7.8
(2.0) (2.0) (2.0) (1.4)
Observations 48 48 48 59 59
Adjusted R-squared 0.88 0.26 0.73 0.74 0.78
s.e. 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.012
NBER 
dates
(b) regressions are estimated with the Prais-Winsten correction for first-order serial 
correlation (STATA command "prais")
(c) standard errors in parentheses
(e) both structures investment variables are measured in 2005 dollars per capita
Each column of the Table reports results from a real per capita non-residential structures 
investment regression.
sum of coef's on real per capita 
housing investment terms
sum of coef's on log male emp. rate 
terms, converted to elasticity
Notes: (a) quarterly observations beginning 1996Q1
recession indicator * (real per capita 
housing investment)
(d) independent variables are current and lagged (up to three lags) real housing per capita 
housing investment and log male emp. rate (rescaled by the mean of the dependent variable) 
and, when applicable, a recession indicator interacted with the those terms.
















Fig 1.  Labor Market Equilibrium with Fixed and Flexible Output Prices
When output price Pt is fixed, employers demand the number of employees needed to produce the output demanded, shown as the vertical curve in the Figure.  
When Pt is flexible, employer demand for labor is elastic according to the marginal product of labor schedule, because wage costs are at least partly passed on to 
customers (who have elastic demand curves).  The Figure displays a single labor “supply” curve that is common to both models.
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